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Finding the evolutionary origins of human language in the communication systems of our closest 38	
living relatives has been a major goal of many in the field of animal communication generally 39	
and primate communication specifically for the last several decades.1-4 The so-called 40	
“functionally referential” signals have long been considered promising in this regard, with 41	
apparent parallels with the semantic communication that characterizes language. Although the 42	
once prominent idea that functionally referential signals are word-like, in that they are arbitrary 43	
sounds associated with phenomena external to the caller, has largely been abandoned,5 the idea 44	
that these signals offer perhaps the strongest link between primate communication and human 45	
language remains widespread, primarily due to the fact the behavior of receivers indicates that 46	
such signals enable them to make very specific inferences about their physical or social 47	
environment. Here we review the concept of functional reference and discuss modern 48	
perspectives that indicate that, although the sophistication of receivers provides some continuity 49	
between nonhuman primate and human cognition, this continuity is not unique to functionally 50	
referential signals. In fact, because functionally referential signals are, by definition, produced 51	
only in specific contexts, receivers are less dependent on the integration of contextual cues with 52	
signal features to determine an appropriate response. The processing of functionally referential 53	
signals is therefore likely to entail simpler cognitive operations than does that of less context-54	
specific signals. While studies of functional reference have been important in highlighting the 55	
relatively sophisticated processes that underlie receiver behavior, we believe that the continued 56	
focus on context-specific calls detracts from the potentially more complex processes underlying 57	
responses to more unspecific calls. In this sense, we argue that the concept of functional 58	
reference, while historically important for the field, has outlived its usefulness and become a red 59	
herring in the pursuit of the links between primate communication and human language. 60	
		
 61	
WHAT ARE FUNCTIONALLY REFERENTIAL SIGNALS, AND WHY ARE THEY 62	
CONSIDERED RELEVANT TO LANGUAGE EVOLUTION? 63	
 64	
Functionally referential signals are those signals in which production is context-specific, with 65	
the relevant contextual feature defining the “referent,” and which elicit specific responses in 66	
signal perceivers even in the absence of the supposed referent (that is, responses are stimulus-67	
independent).6-7 The textbook example of functional reference is the alarm call system of East 68	
African vervet monkeys (now classified as Chlorocebus pygerythrus). First noted by Tom 69	
Struhsaker in the late 1960s, vervets give distinct alarm calls in response to leopards, eagles, and 70	
snakes.8 A little more than a decade later, Robert Seyfarth, Dorothy Cheney, and Peter Marler 71	
conducted playback experiments of each call type in the absence of any predatory stimulus and 72	
noted that the calls alone are sufficient to elicit predator-specific responses. According to the 73	
textbook version of these results, “leopard alarms” regularly cause listeners to run into the trees, 74	
“eagle alarms” cause listeners to look up or run into dense bushes, while the “snake alarms” 75	
cause listeners to stand bipedally and scan the ground.9-10 It should be noted though that the data 76	
presented in the original papers9-10 also indicated substantial variation in responses. This aside, 77	
the calls meet both of the criteria of functional reference because the production of the calls is 78	
context-specific, linked to particular predator types, and because appropriate responses to the 79	
calls are stimulus-independent, deployed even when the contextual cue is absent. This predator-80	
specific alarm call system contrasted with the “urgency-based” systems that had been described 81	
for a number of social rodent taxa, wherein distinct alarm call types might be given in high- and 82	
low-risk situations, respectively, regardless of the type of predator.11 Importantly, the type of call 83	
given by vervets seemed to be independent of risk, with leopards consistently eliciting one call 84	
type regardless if the risk it posed was of high- or low-urgency, and the same being true of the 85	
call types given to raptors and snakes.  86	
 87	
<The discovery of the vervet alarm call system began a revolution in the field of animal 88	
communication because the observations seemed to provide clear evidence against what was 89	
then the predominant view in animal communication: animal vocal signals are a reflection of the 90	
signaler’s internal state and do not refer to phenomena external to the signaler> in the way that 91	
		
human semantic communication does.12 Indeed, the fact each predator-type consistently elicits a 92	
distinct call type, regardless of the level of urgency that it presents, is difficult to explain in this 93	
framework. Shouldn’t a caller’s internal state be affected more by the risk the predator presents 94	
(high versus low) than the type of predator encountered (aerial versus terrestrial)? The fact that 95	
the calls alone were sufficient to elicit predator-specific reactions was interpreted as evidence 96	
that listeners were able to obtain very specific information (a term which has drawn 97	
considerable debate in the animal communication literature in recent years13-18 and which we will 98	
discuss below) from the calls, as if the vocalizations were indeed semantic signals, reinforced the 99	
interpretation that these calls shared more in common with human words than with other animal 100	
signals. 101	
  102	
The honeybee “waggle dance,” which allows hive mates to precisely determine the location of 103	
food and far exceeds the specificity of vervet alarm calls, had been known to ethologists since 104	
the 1940s19 but was not considered especially relevant for the evolution of human language. One 105	
obvious reason for this is the great evolutionary distance separating the social insects from 106	
humans. But the honeybee waggle dance also lacked another key feature of human symbolic 107	
communication: arbitrariness.19 That is, rather than lacking any direct association between the 108	
signal and its meaning, the number of turns in the honeybee’s dance increases with the distance 109	
to the food, while the dancer’s vertical orientation indicates the direction from the hive relative to 110	
the current position of the sun. In contrast, the vervet alarm calls did seem to be arbitrary in that 111	
there is no direct association between the acoustic characteristics of each call type and the type of 112	
predator that each is associated with, leading to an initial conclusion by Seyfarth and colleagues 113	
that the calls are best seen as symbolic and referential.9-10  114	
 115	
Vervet alarm calls and other such context-specific signals were thus typically referred to as 116	
simply “referential” or “semantic” signals by many ethologists until the early 1990s, although 117	
some criticisms arose over the application of such linguistic nomenclature to animal signals.20-21 118	
To judge whether or not this criticism is warranted, it is necessary to briefly review the core 119	
concepts of semiotic theory, which deals with the analysis of signs and signifying practices. 120	
Signs are meaningful units that stand for something other than themselves. According to 121	
Saussure,22 a sign consists of a signifier and the signified, for instance, the relationship between 122	
		
the spoken word “dog” and the actual animal. There are generally three different forms that the 123	
relationship between the signifier and the signified can take: symbolic, iconic, and indexical. In a 124	
symbolic mode, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary and purely 125	
conventional. Most words in human languages meet this definition, although onomatopoeic 126	
elements in human languages, such as the descriptions of animal sounds (“meow,” “woof,” “ey-127	
ore”), are considered to be iconic because the signifier bears a physical resemblance to the 128	
signified. Finally, indexical signifiers indicate the signified because they are in some way 129	
physically or causally linked to it, like smoke is linked to fire, or a vervet’s alarm call is linked to 130	
the presence of the vervet itself.4 This relationship may be obvious or indirectly inferred by the 131	
observer.21,23  132	
 133	
One of the main questions of animal communication researchers interested in the evolution of 134	
language was thus whether any communication system attained a symbolic quality. Because the 135	
vervet alarm calls were viewed as neither indexical nor iconic, they were considered to be 136	
symbolic or proto-symbolic. However, <the core characteristic of symbolic communication is the 137	
arbitrary nature of signals and the importance of conventions.>20 This was at odds with 138	
neuroscientists’ early reports that the structure of nonhuman primate vocalizations was largely 139	
hard-wired, and that no experience was required to develop the species-specific call 140	
characteristics (described in the next section).24-29 Further, the acoustic structure of primate vocal 141	
signals is not arbitrary, but rather is shaped by natural selection such that a given vocalization’s 142	
form is related to its function.13,30 As it became clear that the similarity between human words 143	
and vervet alarms might be less striking than initially assumed, Peter Marler, Chris Evans and 144	
colleagues6,31 suggested the term “functionally referential” to clarify that, although context-145	
specific calls function much in the same way as human words, this conception “remains neutral 146	
about the underlying mental processes.”31:67 Nevertheless, the idea that functionally referential 147	
signals require greater cognitive complexity and provide a clearer link to human language than 148	
do other types of animal signals remains pervasive in the animal communication literature.2,4,32 149	
Since the initial discovery in vervets, vocal signals that meet one or both of the criteria of 150	
functional reference have been described for the social, food, and alarm calls of a range of 151	
primate taxa, including New World monkeys, lemurs, apes, and a number of additional Old 152	
World monkeys.2,4,33-35 Notably, a number of recent studies by Kate Arnold and Klaus 153	
		
Zuberbühler36 have demonstrated that functional reference can be achieved through the 154	
production of context-specific call combinations, even if the individual call types are not context-155	
specific. Other studies have similarly shown that the number of times the same call is produced 156	
can vary with context.35,37-38 Finally, studies that combine bioacoustic analysis with playback 157	
experiments have shown that acoustic variation within call types can also functionally refer to 158	
distinct stimuli.39-40 These observations of widespread functional reference have been taken as 159	
evidence that the phylogenetic roots of human semantic communication likely go deep into the 160	
primate lineage,41 although the fact that several avian and nonprimate mammalian taxa also use 161	
functionally referential food and alarm calls34,43 indicates that context-specific signaling has 162	
likely evolved convergently in many taxa.  163	
 164	
THE INFLEXIBILITY OF SIGNAL PRODUCERS: WHY FUNCTIONALLY 165	
REFERENTIAL SIGNALS ARE NOT SYMBOLIC 166	
The neural foundations of primate vocal production was greatly illuminated by research by Uwe 167	
Jürgens and colleagues beginning in the 1970s.24 According to their research with squirrel 168	
monkeys, the vocal pathway consists of three different subsystems. The first one is responsible 169	
for the initiation of vocalizations. The initiation can be triggered by the anterior cingulate cortex 170	
or by various limbic brain areas, in response to different external or internal stimuli. The so-171	
called peri-aquaeductal grey (PAG) serves as a relay station for the descending vocalization-172	
controlling pathways. The PAG integrates the incoming information and triggers a specific 173	
innate vocal pattern. This system can be found in nonhuman primates and humans alike. The 174	
second system is responsible for the voluntary motor control which is necessary to speak or sing, 175	
and is apparently restricted to humans, at least among primates. The system is comprised of the 176	
motor cortex with its connections to the cerebellum and thalamus as well as the putamen and 177	
pyramidal pathway. Importantly, there is a direct connection between the motor cortex and the 178	
motoneurons controlling the laryngeal muscles. In addition, there are connection between the 179	
limbic cortex and the motor cortex. The third system comprises the formatio reticularis of the 180	
lower brain stem and the motoneurons that innervate the respective muscles for vocal fold, lip, 181	
jaw and tongue movements. This system receives input from the PAG and, in humans, from the 182	
motor cortex. Thus, <the same neurobiological circuits which are responsible for innate 183	
vocalizations are existent in both nonhuman primate and human nonverbal vocal production 184	
		
systems (including laughter and reactions to pain in humans), while the more derived parts 185	
responsible and necessary for voluntary control of vocalizations seem to be limited to humans>, 186	
at least among the primates. This neurobiological evidence accounts for the lack of flexibility in 187	
nonhuman primate vocal control.24,28-29,42  188	
Moreover, no study has ever suggested that – say – vervet monkeys from different populations 189	
would use their calls in fundamentally different ways, such as using an alarm call in an affiliative 190	
situation, or even an eagle alarm in response to a leopard. Indeed, even though learning appears 191	
to be important in the ontogeny of vervet alarm calling, with infants giving alarm calls in 192	
inappropriate contexts,43 their mistakes are not random. Eagle alarms may be given by infants to 193	
nonthreatening stimuli in the air, such as vultures or falling leaves, but they are not given to 194	
terrestrial animals like leopards or warthogs. The role of learning thus seems to be more related 195	
to predator recognition than to learning in what contexts specific vocalizations should be given, 196	
as further evinced by the vocal behavior of Diana monkeys in habitats where leopards have been 197	
extirpated.44 The balance of evidence therefore indicates that although nonhuman primates are 198	
able to (partly) control the onset of calls, they cannot voluntarily choose which call to produce in 199	
which situation.45 Instead, there is a strong link between specific internal states and the 200	
corresponding vocalizations.  201	
A number of recent studies have highlighted the genetic underpinnings of this inflexibility in call 202	
structure and usage by examining how acoustic variation relates to genetic distance. Early work 203	
by Geissmann indicated that acoustic differences in gibbon song mapped onto geographic 204	
distance,46 while more recent studies integrating genetic analyses have revealed that the acoustic 205	
structure of gibbon song and leaf monkey loud calls can largely be explained by genetic 206	
distance.47-48 This actually shows superficial resemblance to the relationship between human 207	
language families and genetic distance at the global scale.49 However, this correlation does not 208	
apply at the smaller scale and, under specific circumstances, a language within a population can 209	
be completely replaced within only 3 or 4 generations.49 210	
Finally, nonhuman primates also differ from humans in terms of the “common ground” of 211	
communication. That is, human communication is seen as fundamentally cooperative, relying on 212	
shared knowledge of the world.21,50-51 While the attribution of mental states and the intent to 213	
		
inform are characteristic of human language, there is only scant evidence that nonhuman 214	
primates vocalize with the intent to inform.52-54 (See Box 1). 215	
The proximate mechanisms underpinning the production of context-specific vocal signals in 216	
particular have not been well studied, and this is likely a fruitful avenue for future research, but 217	
all available evidence indicates that their production is not fundamentally different from less 218	
context-specific calls. Indeed, among Belding’s ground squirrels, playbacks of trills and whistles, 219	
alarm calls associated with terrestrial and aerial predators, respectively, elicit distinct 220	
physiological responses in listeners in terms of heart beat and the production of stress 221	
hormones.55 It is thus not at all inconceivable that different predator types also elicit distinct 222	
types of aversive reactions in vervets and other primates, or that the discovery of food could 223	
elicit a particular degree or type of excitement not elicited by other stimuli, and that there has 224	
been selection for the production of specific signals when in such states. Although <all the 225	
current evidence indicates that the production of even highly context-specific vocalizations is 226	
hardwired in at least most non-human primates>, a better understanding of the specific 227	
mechanisms underlying the production of these signals would most certainly be insightful.  228	
 229	
Box 1. Inflexible signal production: are apes different? 230	
 231	
Research into the vocal behavior of the living great apes has produced considerably less evidence 232	
for functionally referential communication than what has been shown in other primate taxa, due 233	
largely to the fact that predator-specific alarm calls are not ecologically-relevant for these large-234	
bodied species. However, studies conducted over the last several years suggest that the food calls 235	
of chimpanzees and bonobos may well meet the production and perception requirements of 236	
functional reference.33 At the same time, it seems clear that chimps, like most other primates, 237	
have a largely innate vocal repertoire and flexibility in vocal production is highly constrained. 238	
Chimps from different populations, for example, give the same basic call type, “rough grunts,” in 239	
response to food, indicating that the production of a call with these particular acoustic features in 240	
response to food is innate in this species.56 Recent studies have suggested, however, that some 241	
apes may differ from monkeys and prosimians in two critical aspects of vocal production that 242	
typically distinguish nonhuman primate communication from human language: an intent to 243	
		
inform among chimpanzees and a possible role for learning in the development of particular call 244	
types in orangutans. 245	
 246	
Crockford and colleagues54 recently presented evidence that wild chimpanzees are more likely to 247	
give alarm calls upon detecting a snake if other group members present were unlikely to be 248	
aware of the snake’s presence. Such an ability to selectively communicate based on the 249	
knowledge state of the audience would clearly set them apart from monkeys.52 However, such 250	
intentionality also requires a theory of mind, that is, an ability to understand that others have 251	
thoughts, knowledge, and beliefs, and the evidence that chimpanzees possess such abilities has 252	
engendered some controversy.57 Nevertheless, the work by Crockford et al. is suggestive and will 253	
almost certainly inspire additional research into the possibility that communication with the 254	
intent to inform exists in the apes. 255	
 256	
A second recent study has called into question the contention that the vocal repertoires of apes 257	
are completely innate and unlearned. While a number of previous studies have shown that 258	
learning may play some role in the development of “accents” (that is relatively modest variation 259	
in the acoustic structure of otherwise innate call types) among apes, such variation is also fairly 260	
well-documented in a number of species of monkeys.58 More recently, Wich and colleagues58 261	
compared the vocal behavior of orangutans from five different populations and noted differences 262	
between populations in terms of whether or not individuals vocalized in the contexts of nest-263	
building and infant-retrieval, as well as in the specific call types they give in those contexts. 264	
While such “dialectic” differences could potentially be underpinned by genetic differences 265	
between the populations, the authors found that variation between populations was not explained 266	
by the genetic distance between them, and suggested that the differences may evidence a role of 267	
learning in the development of particular call types. Stronger evidence for the imitation of novel, 268	
non-innate sounds among orangutans comes from a captive individual that learned to imitate the 269	
sound of human whistling.59 Notably, though, whistles are not vocalizations because their 270	
production does not involve use of the vocal folds. Still, these findings may have implications for 271	
the neurobiology of vocal communication in the apes. While a degree of vocal learning and 272	
intent to inform among at least some apes may well turn out to close the gap somewhat between 273	
		
humans and other animals in these regards, additional research will be needed before firm 274	
conclusions can be drawn. 275	
 276	
THE FLEXIBILITY OF SIGNAL RECEIVERS AND THE QUESTION OF MEANING 277	
IN ANIMAL COMMUNICATION 278	
 279	
To a certain extent, the responses of primates and other animals to at least some signals appear to 280	
be innate and mediated by the unconscious, nervous system-responses to the acoustic features of 281	
the calls.13,30 For example, infant squirrel monkeys raised in social isolation, and without 282	
previous exposure to alarm calls, respond to alarm call playbacks with generalized startle and 283	
avoid responses, in contrast to control playbacks of other unfamiliar sounds which elicit 284	
exploratory behaviors.60 Such reactions are likely mediated by the acoustic features of alarm 285	
calls, often including sharp onsets, which have almost certainly been shaped by natural selection 286	
because of the unconscious reactions they cause in receivers.30 More specific responses to these 287	
alarm signals, however, appear to be strongly affected by prior experience.61 Indeed, in contrast 288	
to the marked constraints characterizing vocal signal production among primates, behavioral 289	
responses to vocal signals appear to be far more flexible.62 290	
 291	
Vervets again provide an excellent example for understanding the plasticity demonstrated by 292	
signal receivers. Infant vervets, like naïve squirrel monkeys, respond with generalized startle 293	
responses to each of the species-specific alarm call types described above, but do not exhibit the 294	
predator-specific responses characteristic of adults.43 Upon hearing an eagle alarm, infant vervets 295	
are less likely to run into a bush than are adults or juveniles, and more likely to employ a 296	
maladaptive response, such as running into a tree where eagles are adept hunters, or an adaptive 297	
but generalized response, like running to their mother. Watching the behavior of adults does, 298	
however, increase the likelihood that infant vervets will respond with adaptive, predator-specific 299	
behavior, and responses to the different alarm call types become adult-like after several months 300	
of locomotor independence.43 Thus even if innate nervous system reactions to the structure of 301	
signals explains general receiver responses to some degree, the specific responses of receivers 302	
appear not to be hardwired like the production of those same signals is, but rather are shaped by 303	
previous experience.39,61,63-64 Perhaps the most familiar example of this comes from the behavior 304	
		
of domestic dogs, who in exceptional cases can learn to associate several hundred words with 305	
particular objects.65 Such sophisticated responses have been widely interpreted as evidence that 306	
signals elicit mental representations in receivers based on the information extracted from the 307	
signals.62,66-67 Some of the strongest evidence for such mental representations comes from 308	
habituation-dishabituation experiments68, especially those conducted by Zuberbühler and 309	
colleagues,66 which demonstrated that listeners transfer habituation to hearing one call type to a 310	
second (distinct) call type, but only if that second call has an identical “referent.” The striking 311	
asymmetry between inflexible signalers and sophisticated receivers has led to the generally 312	
accepted conclusion that any continuities or parallels that exist between the communication 313	
systems of humans and our extant primate relatives reside, not in the ability of signal producers 314	
to transmit symbolically encoded information, but in the flexible, learned responses of 315	
receivers.4,30,62,69-70  316	
 317	
But how does the inability of nonhuman primates and other terrestrial mammals to produce 318	
symbolically coded vocal signals square with the sophisticated behavior of receivers that 319	
indicates that they interpret signal meaning in a referential-like manner? One possible solution to 320	
the problem, championed most prominently by Drew Rendall, Michael Owren, and colleagues, is 321	
that responses to vocal signals are driven by Pavlovian conditioning working in conjunction with 322	
nervous-system responses induced by the acoustic features of the call.13,30,71-72 Under this “affect-323	
conditioning” model, eagle-specific responses to eagle-specific alarm calls develop because 324	
young listeners are first called to attention by the call’s jarring structure and are, over time, 325	
conditioned by the subsequent events. The response “run into bushes” following the perception 326	
of an eagle alarm develops because eagles are repeatedly seen in short order after hearing the 327	
calls, and the affective response (that is, the emotional or motivational reaction experienced by 328	
the listener) triggered by the eagle is eventually transferred to the eagle alarm itself via 329	
associative learning. Thus, based on such principles, it is possible that specific responses to 330	
signals can develop with experience based on simple classical conditioning and without drawing 331	
on the concept of information, the meaning of calls, or mental representations of a signal’s 332	
purported referent in listeners.71 Such an explanation is therefore appealing to adherents of 333	
Morgan’s Canon, which states that psychologically simpler explanations for a given behavior 334	
should be accepted as more likely than psychologically more complex ones.73  335	
		
  336	
Although receiver responses to calls can potentially be explained by conditioning and without 337	
evoking information transfer, Owren and Rendall30 acknowledged that a lack of ability for 338	
signalers to encode symbolic information or intentionally inform is not inherently incompatible 339	
with an ability of receivers to be informed by signals or attribute some sense of meaning to them. 340	
Indeed, we might say, for example, that the sound of footsteps means that someone is coming (or 341	
going) or that a sudden burst of laughter means that someone is in a joyous state. We are 342	
informed by such nonlinguistic cues and signals in the sense that they have reduced our 343	
uncertainty about our environment, including the probability of the presence of another 344	
individual and their emotional state, even though these sounds do not have semantic meaning 345	
and are not produced with the intent to inform. The term “information” as it relates to animal 346	
communication has similarly been defined as a reduction in uncertainty in signal receivers.14,18,70  347	
 348	
A given primate vocal signal may therefore have meaning to a receiver, even if semantic 349	
communication on the part of the signaler now seems to now be out of the realm of possibility 350	
when it comes to primate calls.20 But it is important for students of animal communication to 351	
keep in mind what this sense of “meaning” really is. It is equivalent to what linguist Paul Grice 352	
termed “natural meaning,”51 which contrasts specifically with the symbolic meaning 353	
characteristic of human words. Unlike words, signals with natural meaning mean x only in that 354	
they indicate the likelihood of the occurrence of x because of a natural spatial or temporal 355	
association with x.15 Based on this logic, Terrence Deacon has argued that functionally 356	
referential signals are best seen as indexical signals.20 Although it’s reasonably clear how signals 357	
with such indicating functions may well lead to uncertainty reduction in primates and other 358	
animals, empirically distinguishing between informational and affect-conditioning accounts is 359	
difficult,4 and there have been no experimental studies which unequivocally support one 360	
mechanism over the other.  361	
 362	
THE GENERATION OF INFORMATION AND ATTRIBUTION OF MEANING BY 363	
RECEIVERS: THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT 364	
 365	
		
Although neither conclusively demonstrated nor universally accepted, the idea that animal 366	
signals convey information and have meaning, at least in the minds of the receivers, has been 367	
prominent in animal communication even prior to the discovery of functionally referential 368	
signals.13 Proponents of this approach generally argue that the information provided by signals 369	
comes from their statistical regularities with particular features of the physical and social 370	
environment in which they are produced.18,62 In other words, the uncertainty regarding a given 371	
event is reduced for a signal receiver because of the statistical association between the signal and 372	
the event, as established through prior experience with the signal. Information is potentially 373	
available, in the same way that smoke can potentially inform an observer about the likelihood of 374	
a fire,15 but must be generated by the receiver based on prior experience with the signal and its 375	
statistical regularities with other phenomena in the world.18 Importantly, this is not incompatible 376	
with the affect-conditioning model. Indeed, proponents of the informational perspective have 377	
invoked classical and operant conditioning to explain how animals learn the association between 378	
signals and particular events.62 A primary distinction between proponents and critics of the 379	
informational perspective is that the former allow for prior conditioning to elicit mental 380	
representations of the event based on perceiving the signal.74  381	
 382	
The strength of the regularities between a signal and the physical and social environment 383	
determines the degree to which receivers can obtain precise information from the signal alone.52 384	
In the case of functionally referential signals, the statistical association between the signal and 385	
the eliciting context (that is, the purported referent) is by definition very high, thereby providing 386	
receivers with the potential to reduce uncertainty to a very high degree. Strong statistical 387	
regularities, however, are not limited to associations with external phenomena such as predators 388	
or food. In many cases, the acoustic structure of a given vocal signal will vary with factors such 389	
as an individual’s body size, sex, dominance status, or subsequent behavior.75-77 While these 390	
kinds of associated factors have been explicitly excluded in discussions of call “referents,”6,78 391	
there doesn’t seem to be any inherent difference for signal perceivers if the relevant statistical 392	
association is with an environmental feature external to the caller or is solely a feature internal to 393	
the caller itself. Furthermore, responses to signals that are in accordance with uncertainty 394	
reduction regarding the occurrence of particular events are also found in cases in which the 395	
		
statistical associations between the signal and those particular events are relatively weak. The 396	
generalized alarm calls of many primates and screams of baboons provide two examples. 397	
 398	
Many primates, including lemurs, New World monkeys, and a number of forest-living Old 399	
World monkeys, have been shown to give distinct calls in response to aerial and terrestrial 400	
predators, respectively.6,34-35,79-80 However, in contrast to what was has been described for 401	
vervets, these calls are not always specific to encounters with potential predators, but are 402	
sometimes given in other contexts that are, like predator detections,81 likely to elicit a stress 403	
response.34-35,82 In most cases, these tend to be aggressive interactions within or between groups, 404	
but at least in tufted capuchin monkeys also includes competitive situations without overt 405	
aggression.83 Interestingly, across species it tends to be the call associated with terrestrial 406	
predators that is given in other contexts, whereas the call associated with aerial predators tends to 407	
be context-specific and meet the criteria of functional reference.34-35,84 Despite not being context-408	
specific, playbacks of the terrestrial predator-associated alarms of these species still elicit 409	
terrestrial predator-specific responses in listeners, although responses to less specific alarm calls 410	
may vary more than responses to strictly context-specific ones.85 For example, the aerial and 411	
terrestrial predator-associated alarms of saddleback tamarins cause listeners to look up and 412	
down, respectively, where each predator would most likely be spotted.84 However, whereas 413	
production of the aerial predator call seems to be specific to encounters with raptors, terrestrial 414	
predator-associated alarms are also given during aggressive intergroup encounters. In turn, 415	
listeners most often look up immediately following a playback of an aerial predator alarm call, 416	
but are more likely to first look towards the speaker when terrestrial predator alarms are played, 417	
with glances downward most often coming afterward. Taking the informational perspective, the 418	
responses of listeners are still in line with interpretations that the latter calls elicit mental 419	
representations of a terrestrial predator, but suggests that listeners must take  into account 420	
additional contextual variables (such as the presence or absence of a rival group) before ascribing 421	
precise meaning to the call. The primary difference between functionally referential alarm calls 422	
and these less specific terrestrial predator alarm calls, then, seems to be not in the potential for 423	
listeners to make inferences about the presence of particular predator types, but rather in the 424	
degree to which listeners must integrate contextual cues with signal perception in order to do so. 425	
 426	
		
The screams of baboons provide an even greater demonstration of uncertainty reduction through 427	
the integration of signal and context. Like the terrestrial predator alarm calls of most primates, 428	
the screams of baboons would not be considered functionally referential because they do not 429	
meet the definitional requirement of context-specificity of production. Although such calls are 430	
most commonly given in response to aggression from conspecifics, these range from mild 431	
aggression over food to potentially infanticidal events, and they can also occur during encounters 432	
with predators, parent-offspring conflicts, and other potentially stressful situations.69 Although 433	
one function of screams is likely to create annoyance in the individual that is antagonizing the 434	
caller (in these examples the aggressor, predator, or parent) and thereby alter their behavior for 435	
the benefit of the caller,30 screams can further benefit the caller by attracting allies to come to its 436	
aid.86-87  While a scream alone may be insufficient to provide  listeners with any more 437	
information than that the screamer is in distress, the responses of listeners, in at least some cases, 438	
indicates that their uncertainty reduction exceeds this basic information and includes the factors 439	
that are likely to be causing the signaler to be distressed.  For example, the responses of males to 440	
the screams of female “friends” (that is, females with whom the male regularly associates 441	
affiliatively, and in almost all cases mated with during the previous conceptive cycle) depends on 442	
such additional contextual cues such as whether the calling female currently has a dependent 443	
infant and whether the aggressor is likely an infanticidal male. This was demonstrated by Ryne 444	
Palombit and colleagues86 by examining the behavior of males following playbacks of female 445	
screams. Males were found to respond more strongly to screams given by female friends than by 446	
other females (which they tended to ignore), but only if the female friend had a dependent infant; 447	
following the death of an infant, male responses to screams from the same female weakened. 448	
Further, the responses of male friends were strongest when the females’ screams were coupled 449	
with threat calls from a potentially infanticidal male. The responses of males thus varied based 450	
on the broader contextual variables associated with the signal, specifically those contextual 451	
variables that indicated that the signal was likely to be associated with a potential infanticide 452	
event rather than, say, a fight between the female friend and another female over access to a 453	
contested resource. In this case, the scream alone provides only limited information to receivers 454	
(that the caller is in distress), but the behavior of male listeners indicates that the total 455	
information they infer is far richer. 456	
 457	
		
As these and numerous other examples demonstrate,62 <even non-functionally referential calls 458	
can elicit behaviors in receivers that are equally indicative of attribution of meaning as are 459	
responses to context-specific, functionally referential calls>, at least if one accepts the 460	
informational perspective. The ability of animals to do so appears to lie in the additional 461	
contextual information available to them outside of the signal itself. A tamarin’s terrestrial 462	
predator alarm is likely to be indicative of the presence of a predator only if a rival group is not 463	
present, while the presence of an infant and the aggressive vocalizations of a newly dominant 464	
male adds to the information regarding a female’s emotional state that baboons are able to get 465	
from hearing her scream. The meaning that these relatively ambiguous calls have to perceivers 466	
thus depends on the integration of the signal with the broader contextual cues surrounding the 467	
signal’s production (Fig. 1a). In contrast, because the relevant contextual cues for ascribing 468	
meaning to functionally referential signals are held constant (for example, raptors are invariably 469	
present when aerial predator alarms are given), it is not necessary for perceivers to integrate such 470	
cues to do so (Fig. 1b). Thus if we are to accept that animal signals, even those that are not 471	
functionally referential, have meaning to their recipients, and that this meaning is derived from 472	
both the signal and the broader context in which it is produced (ideas which have been broadly 473	
accepted by adherents of informational perspectives in animal communication for decades),12,31 474	
then it seems logical to deduce that the attribution of precise meaning is a cognitively simpler 475	
process when the calls are context-specific and meaning is invariable.  In other words, the 476	
meaning of functionally referential signals can be deduced without the need to take current 477	
context into account, while the integration of signal and context are crucial to deduce the 478	
meaning of calls that are not context-specific.  479	
 480	
This is not to say that the integration of contextual cues plays no role in any part of the process 481	
by which receivers respond to functionally referential calls, but it is important to distinguish 482	
between a receiver’s attribution of meaning to a signal on the one hand, and it’s response to the 483	
signal, given that meaning, on the other. We argue that for signals that are context-specific, 484	
contextual cues need to be taken into account only in the decision-making process, that is, how to 485	
respond to the signal (Fig. 1b). In contrast, when the production of signals is not context-specific, 486	
receivers must take contextual cues into account both to attribute meaning to a signal and to 487	
make a decision regarding the best course of action considering that meaning (Fig 1a). If we take 488	
		
again vervet alarm calls as an example, the reactions of listeners may vary based on additional 489	
contextual factors, including the location of the listener at the time of the alarm: listeners on the 490	
ground react differently to alarm calls than do individuals in trees, presumably because the 491	
degree of danger that the different predators pose to individuals when in each location.10 Thus for 492	
functionally referential signals, even though attribution of meaning is by definition independent 493	
of context, contextual cues are nevertheless important in determining an appropriate response.  494	
 495	
In contrast, when production of a signal is less context-specific, taking contextual cues into 496	
account is important for both the generation of meaning and decision-making in terms of the 497	
response. Thus in the case of baboon screams, contextual cues first allow listeners to infer the 498	
likelihood of an infanticidal event (attribution of meaning), and then are of further importance in 499	
determining the response of individuals (decision-making). This explains why males who are not 500	
friends of the screaming female are less likely to respond. Weak responses by such males, we 501	
argue, should not be taken to indicate that they get no information from the scream (there’s no 502	
inherent reason that only friends are able to take advantage of the signal’s potential information), 503	
but that the meaning has less relevance to them because there’s little reason for them to be 504	
concerned of a potential infanticide of an infant that they did not sire. 505	
 506	
In this section we have, if only for the sake of argument, assumed that the concept of information 507	
explains receiver behavior at the proximate level better than do affect-conditioning models.18  508	
Although we cannot yet state unequivocally that responses to signals are indeed driven 509	
proximately by either conditioning or uncertainty reduction, it is our opinion that the balance of 510	
current evidence favors the informational perspective, although receiver behavior in a minority 511	
of cases may be better explained by affect-conditioning or pure nervous system reactions than 512	
attribution of meaning,70 and we argue that it is these cases in which receiver responses vary 513	
based on broader contextual cues that demonstrates this most strongly. In cases in which call 514	
production is context-specific, it’s easy to see how seemingly complex behaviors, such as 515	
predator-specific responses, can develop based on relatively simple Pavlovian conditioning. 516	
There’s also no inherent reason why conditioning cannot cause signals to induce multiple 517	
affective responses based on additional contextual variables (that is, signal S causes emotional 518	
response R in context C, but emotional response R’ in context C’), and indeed this may well 519	
		
explain why, for example, capuchin monkeys are more likely to ignore terrestrial predator-520	
related alarm calls in competitive feeding contexts, when the calls are less likely to be associated 521	
with a predator and more likely to be related to conflicts with other group members.85 However, 522	
achieving variation in responses based on context via conditioning becomes increasingly 523	
complex as variation in the relevant contexts increases. In addition, when specific contextual 524	
conditions occur relatively rarely, there may be little possibility to be conditioned to perform 525	
specific responses to signals observed to occur under those circumstances. Thus although the 526	
affect-conditioning model is more “cognitively parsimonious” than are informational accounts in 527	
explaining signal responses, it’s not clear that it is an overall more parsimonious explanation, 528	
given the many steps that an individual would have to go through to, for example, perform the 529	
varied responses to screams like those observed in male baboons. Likewise, it seems most 530	
parsimonious to explain the differential reactions that baboons show to playbacks that simulate 531	
aggression among other group members, including looking towards the kin of those involved in 532	
the “fight,”69 as an indication that listeners take advantage of the potential information that 533	
signals make available.  Of course, less parsimonious is not the same as incorrect, and both 534	
affect-conditioning and information-based explanations are hypotheses to be tested,88 although 535	
this will be no easy task. 536	
 537	
FUNCTIONALLY REFERENTIAL SIGNALS ARE NOT INHERENTLY DIFFERENT 538	
FROM OTHER TYPES OF ANIMAL SIGNALS 539	
 540	
We agree with proponents of the referential signaling paradigm that signals with a high degree of 541	
context-specificity of production have the potential to provide receivers with specific 542	
information and allow them to make predictions about their environment without the aid of 543	
additional contextual cues.52 At the same time, it’s clear that the vervet leopard alarm does not 544	
refer to leopards in the way the English word “leopard” does.20 Rather, to a listener the call 545	
means that a leopard is present in the same way that the leopard’s growl does, or even the way 546	
that the sound of dry leaves crunching under a leopard’s foot step might. By the same token, 547	
calls with less context-specificity can have just as much meaning to a listener. Contact notes, for 548	
example, which are given in a range of contexts and function to maintain appropriate spacing 549	
between individuals, may mean to a listener that “individual x is currently approximately in 550	
		
direction y at distance z,” a message which is not inherently more complex than “a leopard is 551	
somewhere nearby.” Likewise, a subordinate juvenile’s scream means something different to a 552	
baboon listener than does the same type of call from the alpha female, just as a non-semantic 553	
chuckle from James Bond means something different to a human listener than does an 554	
acoustically identical laugh from Dr. No. It is also irrelevant, from the receiver’s perspective, if 555	
the signal has a statistical relationship with some phenomenon external, or only internal, to the 556	
signaler – one should not be inherently more complex for an animal to infer than the other.  557	
 558	
Given that there is no apparent difference in the mechanisms that underlie the production of 559	
context-specific and non-specific calls in primates and most other animals, and that listeners are 560	
able to integrate contextual cues with signal features to respond to calls that are not context-561	
specific as if they have some meaning (much as users of language do when processing words 562	
whose meaning depends on context), then it follows that neither the production nor the 563	
perception of functionally referential signals is anywhere closer to human communication than is 564	
that of non-functionally referential signals. In fact, <it is precisely because their production is so 565	
closely tied to particular contexts, making the integration of contextual cues less critical for the 566	
generation of meaning, that functionally referential signals are likely less cognitively demanding 567	
for perceivers!> While a knee-jerk reaction may be sufficient for a signal with unambiguous 568	
meaning, it takes additional cognitive processing to interpret a signal whose meaning is less clear 569	
and context-dependent. In this light, we would argue that functionally referential signals have 570	
become a red herring in the search for the cognitive link between primate communication and 571	
human language.  572	
 573	
That’s not to say that the focus on context-specific calls has in any way been a waste. Indeed, we 574	
believe that the concept of functional reference has been insightful in terms of understanding the 575	
importance of statistical regularities in driving receiver responses. Perhaps the paradigm’s 576	
greatest contribution has been the demonstration that, despite great differences in the 577	
mechanisms underlying signal production, there are striking similarities between humans and 578	
other primates in signal perception.52 But by now this is so well understood and widely 579	
acknowledged, even getting the occasional nod from critics of the informational-perspective,30 580	
that we should consider if the framework of functional reference is still a useful one. We believe 581	
		
that it is not. It over-emphasizes the importance of signals that have relatively strong statistical 582	
associations with events external to the caller, and under-emphasizes the similarities such calls 583	
share with less context-specific calls in terms of the mechanisms that underlie both their 584	
production and perception.   585	
 586	
For those interested in primate communication for what it can tell us about the evolution of 587	
human language, the referential signaling paradigm also tends to draw attention away from what 588	
we believe will be a more productive framework as the field moves forward: pragmatics, the 589	
field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of linguistic 590	
utterances.4,21,89-90 With a few notable exceptions, including playback experiments by Klaus 591	
Zuberbühler91 and Drew Rendall,92 very little research has thus far been conducted with the 592	
specific intent of understanding how contextual variation contributes to variation in the 593	
attribution of meaning among primates. At this point, it’s not at all clear that the integration of 594	
contextual information with a signal is particularly cognitively taxing, but this is a hypothesis 595	
ripe for testing. Clearly, the ability to do so is not limited to primates, but is also present in at 596	
least some avian taxa and probably many other mammals.70 Identifying the taxa that do and do 597	
not have these abilities, as well as the extent of the abilities in various taxa, will be crucial for 598	
understanding how cognitively taxing it actually is. 599	
 600	
In conclusion, while context-specific calls may well be functionally referential, it seems inherent 601	
in the informational perspective that any signal which informs recipients is, whatever it’s degree 602	
of degree of statistical association with a given phenomenon, internal or external to the signaler, 603	
functionally referential to one degree or another. But applying the term universally to all signals 604	
in which receiver behavior is best explained in terms of information is rather superfluous and 605	
unlikely to provide additional insight. We thus recommend dropping the term “functionally 606	
referential signals” from the animal communication literature in favor of more accurate, and 607	
linguistically neutral, descriptions such as “context-specific signals,” “predator-specific alarm 608	
calls,” or “food-specific calls.” Context-specificity is still, of course, an interesting phenomenon, 609	
and there are a number of open questions in this regard. We don’t yet, for example, fully 610	
understand the ecological and social conditions which favor their evolution. While the prediction 611	
that the need for distinct reactions in response to different predator types favors the evolution of 612	
		
predator-specific alarm calls6 has been largely supported, the reason that so many primates have 613	
evolved specific alarm calls for raptors but more general alarms for terrestrial predators remains 614	
a puzzle.36 Likewise, recent attempts to understand the factors that favor the evolution of food-615	
specific calls have illuminated how little we know in this regard.33 Research into such 616	
ecologically-based questions is likely to be far more fruitful than would further attempts to find 617	
true referentiality in animal signals. The evidence reviewed here strongly indicates that the latter 618	
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  630	
		
Figure 1. Schematic diagram illustrating the importance of contextual cues for signal receivers 631	
to attribute meaning to the signal and to make a decision regarding how to respond to the signal, 632	
two related but distinct aspects of signal perception. A) When the production of a given signal is 633	
not context-specific, receivers must integrate contextual cues with signal characteristics in order 634	
to ascribe precise meaning to the signal. Contextual cues must also be taken into account in 635	
deciding which response to the signal would, from the receiver’s perspective, be most 636	
appropriate. B) When the production of a given signal is context-specific, as is the case for 637	
functionally referential signals, receivers do not need to take current contextual features into 638	
account to attribute meaning to a signal, because meaning is constant as a direct result of the 639	
prior context-specificity. Context becomes important for receivers only in the decision-making 640	
process regarding the behavioral response to the signal. The need to integrate contextual 641	
information with the characteristics of the signal only for non-functionally referential signals 642	
suggests that attributing meaning to these signals may require a greater degree of cognitive 643	
sophistication, contrasting with the common implication that functionally referential signals are 644	
indicative of greater cognitive sophistication.32 645	
 646	
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